The having objection to bundle theories of subjects of experience.
The self or subject of experiences is often regarded as a mysterious entity, prompting approaches that seek to deflate it, metaphysically speaking. One such approach is the bundle theory, the most well-known version of which holds that each subject is a bundle of experiences. This version of the bun...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 74; no. 4; pp. 1367 - 1376 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Oct2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=180267800&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 180267800 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318094 PHQ jtl: Philosophical Quarterly issn: 00318094 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2024 vid: 74 iid: 4 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 180267800 10.1093/pq/pqae040 ppf: 1367 ppct: 9 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 244KB tig: atl: The having objection to bundle theories of subjects of experience. aug: au: O'Conaill, Donnchadh affil: Université de Fribourg , Switzerland su: Nuclear weapons Pressure groups Public administration Ethics Philosophy sug: subj: Nuclear weapons Pressure groups Public administration Ethics Philosophy keyword: bundle theory co-presence experiences having objection subject of experiences ab: The self or subject of experiences is often regarded as a mysterious entity, prompting approaches that seek to deflate it, metaphysically speaking. One such approach is the bundle theory, the most well-known version of which holds that each subject is a bundle of experiences. This version of the bundle theory seems vulnerable to the having objection: since subjects have experiences, they cannot be identical with bundles of experiences. I shall argue that while the having objection is intuitively plausible, its dialectical force is limited since it does not work without substantial further metaphysical assumptions. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: © 2019 Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St. Andrews. item: Philosophical Quarterly holder: Oxford University Press / USA dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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