Validity of inferences and validity of demonstrations.
The lecture spells out the difference between the validity of inference (‐figure)s and validity applied to demonstrations ('proof acts'). The latter notion is not an ordinary characterizing one; in Brentano's terminology it is a modifying one. A demonstration lacking validity is not a real demonstra...
| Published in: | Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy Vol. 90; no. 5; pp. 459 - 479 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Oct2024
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=180348106&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 180348106 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00405825 HL0 jtl: Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy issn: 00405825 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Oct2024 vid: 90 iid: 5 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 180348106 10.1111/theo.12542 ppf: 459 ppct: 20 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 233KB tig: atl: Validity of inferences and validity of demonstrations. aug: au: Sundholm, Göran affil: Leiden University, Leiden, Netherlands su: Inference (Logic) History of philosophy Assertions (Logic) Language & languages Prawitz, Dag sug: subj: Inference (Logic) History of philosophy Assertions (Logic) Language & languages Prawitz, Dag ab: The lecture spells out the difference between the validity of inference (‐figure)s and validity applied to demonstrations ('proof acts'). The latter notion is not an ordinary characterizing one; in Brentano's terminology it is a modifying one. A demonstration lacking validity is not a real demonstration, just as a false friend is no true friend. Throughout, the treatment makes crucial use of an epistemological perspective that is cast in the first person. Furthermore, the difference between (logical) consequence among propositions and the validity of inference from judgement to judgement is explained. Particular attention is paid to alleged issues of circularity in the definition of the validity of inference, and to the 'explosion' validity of inference from contradictory premisses. Drawing upon a version of the dialogical framework of Per Martin‐Löf, namely, 'When I say Therefore, I give others my permission to assert the conclusion', while stressing also the importance of the first person perspective, both difficulties can be neutralized. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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