The Death of the Data Subject.

This paper situates the data privacy debate in the context of what I call the death of the data subject. My central claim is that concept of a rights-bearing data subject is being pulled in two contradictory directions at once, and that simultaneous attention to these is necessary to understand and...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Law, Culture & the Humanities Vol. 20; no. 3; pp. 527 - 548
Autor principal: Hull, Gordon
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Sage Publications Inc. Oct2024
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: The Death of the Data Subject.
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        au: Hull, Gordon
        affil: UNC Charlotte, USA
      su:
        Human facial recognition software
        Biometric identification
        Power (Social sciences)
        Big data
        Arbitration & award
      sug:
        subj:
          Human facial recognition software
          Biometric identification
          Power (Social sciences)
          Big data
          Arbitration & award
      keyword:
        big data
        biometrics
        privacy
        subjectivity
      ab: This paper situates the data privacy debate in the context of what I call the death of the data subject. My central claim is that concept of a rights-bearing data subject is being pulled in two contradictory directions at once, and that simultaneous attention to these is necessary to understand and resist the extractive practices of the data industry. Specifically, it is necessary to treat the problems facing the data subject structurally, rather than by narrowly attempting to vindicate its rights. On the one hand, the data industry argues that subjects of biometric identification lack legal standing to pursue claims in court, and Facebook recently denied that that its facial recognition software recognizes faces. On the other hand, industry takes consent to terms of service and arbitration clauses to create enforceable legal subject positions, while using promises of personalization to create a phenomenological subject that is unaware of the extent to which it is being manipulated. Data subjects thus have no legal existence when it is a matter of corporate liability, but legal accountability when it is a matter of their own liability. Successful reform should address the power asymmetries between individuals and data companies that enable this structural disempowerment.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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