Degrees of Epistemic Opacity.

This article discusses the notions of 'epistemic opacity' -- referred to here as 'weak epistemic opacity' -- and 'essential epistemic opacity' originally proposed by Paul Humphreys, and defends the idea that epistemic opacity, in general, should be taken as a concept coming in degrees. This approach...

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Publicado en:Teorema Vol. 43; no. 2; pp. 5 - 22
Autor principal: Pedro, Iñaki San
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Teorema 2024
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        Epistemic Opacity
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        This article discusses the notions of 'epistemic opacity' -- referred to here as 'weak epistemic opacity' -- and 'essential epistemic opacity' originally proposed by Paul Humphreys, and defends the idea that epistemic opacity, in general, should be taken as a concept coming in degrees. This approach helps to put into perspective and better understand the close relationship between the notion of epistemic opacity and concrete scientific practices.
        Este artículo analiza las nociones de "opacidad epistémica"-denominada aquí "opacidad epistémica débil"- y "opacidad epistémica esencial", propuestas originalmente por Paul Humphreys, y defiende la idea de que la opacidad epistémica debe tomarse, en general, como un concepto que viene en grados. Este enfoque ayuda a poner en perspectiva y a comprender mejor la estrecha relación entre la noción de opacidad epistémica y las prácticas científicas concretas.
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