Delusions and the Predictive Mind.
A growing number of studies in both the scientific and the philosophical literature have drawn on a Bayesian predictive processing framework to account for the formation of delusions. The key here is that delusions form because of disrupted prediction error signalling. Parrott's recent critique argu...
| Published in: | Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 102; no. 4; pp. 1014 - 1030 |
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| Main Authors: | , |
| Format: | Article |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Dec2024
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=180386882&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 180386882 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00048402 BHK jtl: Australasian Journal of Philosophy issn: 00048402 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2024 vid: 102 iid: 4 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 180386882 10.1080/00048402.2023.2293825 ppf: 1014 ppct: 16 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.3MB tig: atl: Delusions and the Predictive Mind. aug: au: Bongiorno, Federico Corlett, Philip R affil: University of Oxford Yale University su: Delusions Philosophy Statistical hypothesis testing Bayesian analysis Statistical decision making sug: subj: Delusions Philosophy Statistical hypothesis testing Bayesian analysis Statistical decision making keyword: delusions prediction error predictive processing ab: A growing number of studies in both the scientific and the philosophical literature have drawn on a Bayesian predictive processing framework to account for the formation of delusions. The key here is that delusions form because of disrupted prediction error signalling. Parrott's recent critique argues that the framework is incomplete in two respects: (i) it leaves unclear why delusional hypotheses are selected over none at all, or over more plausible alternatives; and (ii) it leaves unclear how exactly it is that delusional hypotheses are generated in the first place. In this paper, we defend the framework's explanatory power by way of showing how it can go a long way in helping disentangle these concerns. We take up each of them in turn. As for the first, our argument turns on two claims: (a) believing nothing, although possible in principle, may not be a viable procedure in the circumstances; and (b) alternative hypotheses may be rendered unavailable for selection, due to aberrant prediction errors. As for the second concern, we distinguish three ways in which delusional hypotheses may be initially acquired, all of which are based on experience broadly construed. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Australasian Journal of Philosophy is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Australasian Journal of Philosophy holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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