The folk concept of the good life: neither happiness nor well-being.
The concept of a good life is usually assumed by philosophers to be equivalent to that of well-being, or perhaps of a morally good life, and hence has received little attention as a potentially distinct subject matter. In a series of experiments participants were presented with vignettes involving s...
| Published in: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 181; no. 10; pp. 2525 - 2539 |
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| Main Authors: | , |
| Format: | Article |
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Springer Nature
Oct2024
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=180402803&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 180402803 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2024 vid: 181 iid: 10 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 180402803 10.1007/s11098-024-02187-7 ppf: 2525 ppct: 14 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 851KB tig: atl: The folk concept of the good life: neither happiness nor well-being. aug: au: Kneer, Markus Haybron, Dan affil: https://ror.org/01faaaf77 IDea_Lab, University of Graz, Graz, Austria https://ror.org/01p7jjy08 Department of Philosophy, Saint Louis University, St. Louis, USA su: Happiness Well-being Ethics Eudaimonism Virtue sug: subj: Happiness Well-being Ethics Eudaimonism Virtue keyword: Eudaimonia Flourishing Good life Moral psychology Morality Welfare ab: The concept of a good life is usually assumed by philosophers to be equivalent to that of well-being, or perhaps of a morally good life, and hence has received little attention as a potentially distinct subject matter. In a series of experiments participants were presented with vignettes involving socially sanctioned wrongdoing toward outgroup members. Findings indicated that, for a large majority, judgments of bad character strongly reduce ascriptions of the good life, while having no impact at all on ascriptions of happiness or well-being. Taken together with earlier findings these results suggest that the lay concept of a good life is clearly distinct from those of happiness, well-being, or morality, likely encompassing both morality and well-being, and perhaps other values as well: whatever matters in a person's life. Importantly, morality appears not to play a fundamental role in either happiness or well-being among the folk. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2024. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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