Implicit knowledge in unawareness structures.
Awareness structures by Fagin, Halpern (Artif Intell 34:39–76, 1988) (FH) feature a syntactic awareness correspondence and accessibility relations modeling implicit knowledge. They are a flexible model of unawareness, and best interpreted from an outside modeler’s perspective. Unawareness structures...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 204; no. 5; pp. 1 - 42 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Nov2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=180414503&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 180414503 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Nov2024 vid: 204 iid: 5 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 180414503 10.1007/s11229-024-04706-9 ppf: 1 ppct: 41 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 1.1MB tig: atl: Implicit knowledge in unawareness structures. aug: au: Belardinelli, Gaia Schipper, Burkhard C. affil: https://ror.org/00f54p054 Department of Philosophy, Stanford University, Palo Alto, USA Department of Economics, University of California, Davis, USA sug: keyword: Awareness C70 D83 Explicit knowledge Implicit knowledge Unawareness ab: Awareness structures by Fagin, Halpern (Artif Intell 34:39–76, 1988) (FH) feature a syntactic awareness correspondence and accessibility relations modeling implicit knowledge. They are a flexible model of unawareness, and best interpreted from an outside modeler’s perspective. Unawareness structures by Heifetz et al. (J Econ Theory, 130:78–94, 2006, Games Econ Behav 62:305–324, 2008) (HMS) model awareness by a lattice of state spaces and explicit knowledge via possibility correspondences. Sublattices thereof can be interpreted as subjective views of agents. Open questions include (1) how implicit knowledge can be defined in HMS structures, and (2) in which way FH structures can be extended to model the agents’ subjective views. In this paper, we address (1) by defining implicit knowledge such that it is consistent with explicit knowledge in HMS models. We also introduce a variant of HMS models that instead of explicit knowledge, takes implicit knowledge and awareness as primitives. Further, we address (2) by introducing a category of FH models that are modally equivalent relative to sublanguages and can be interpreted as agents’ subjective views depending on their awareness. These constructions allow us to show an equivalence between HMS and FH models. As a corollary, we obtain soundness and completeness of HMS models with respect to the Logic of Propositional Awareness, based on a language featuring both implicit and explicit knowledge. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2024. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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