Unearned Inequality and Biased Distributional Preferences: Evidence from a Lab Experiment in Ghana.
I use a dictator game, with a preceding production phase, to explore how different sources of unearned inequality influence distribution decisions. The experiment introduces three inequalities: (1) inequality due to investment success, (2) inequality of initial endowments, and (3) inequality in a re...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Development Studies Vol. 60; no. 11; pp. 1713 - 1735 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Nov2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=180430412&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 180430412 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00220388 JDS jtl: Journal of Development Studies issn: 00220388 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Nov2024 vid: 60 iid: 11 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 180430412 10.1080/00220388.2024.2361161 ppf: 1713 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T db: hlh ui: 180430412 – @attributes: type: P db: hlh ui: 180430412 tig: atl: Unearned Inequality and Biased Distributional Preferences: Evidence from a Lab Experiment in Ghana. aug: au: Gallenstein, Richard A. affil: The Catholic University of America, Washington, DC, USA su: Fairness Success Respect Endowments Dictators sug: subj: Fairness Success Respect Grantmaking Foundations Endowments Dictators keyword: distributional preferences experimental games fairness views inequality distributional preferences experimental games fairness views inequality ab: I use a dictator game, with a preceding production phase, to explore how different sources of unearned inequality influence distribution decisions. The experiment introduces three inequalities: (1) inequality due to investment success, (2) inequality of initial endowments, and (3) inequality in a real-effort task requirement for receiving the initial endowment. I find that participants in rural Ghana respect each inequality, adjusting their allocation decisions in response to investment success, the distribution of initial endowments, and the effort requirement. Their distributional preferences suggest an interaction between the sources where those with high initial endowments are more likely to respect project success outcomes. Moreover, participants demonstrate a self-serving bias in fairness preferences, where those with high initial endowments and successful projects are more likely to respect inequality. Finally, I find a significant increase in self-allocations when participants must exert effort to receive their endowment. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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