Food and fraud: On the Codfather and harvest mislabeling.
We study incentives to mislabel output in multispecies fisheries managed by tradeable catch shares. Firms can save quota costs by misreporting species harvested, as seen in criminal proceedings against the Codfather. We show that price elasticities for the abundant species reported in the cheating w...
| Published in: | RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 55; no. 3; pp. 463 - 499 |
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| Main Authors: | , |
| Format: | Article |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Sep2024
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=180608074&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 180608074 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 07416261 56RJ jtl: RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) issn: 07416261 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Sep2024 vid: 55 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 180608074 10.1111/1756-2171.12476 ppf: 463 ppct: 36 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 1MB tig: atl: Food and fraud: On the Codfather and harvest mislabeling. aug: au: DePiper, Geret Holzer, Jorge affil: NOAA Fisheries, Northeast Fisheries Science Center The opinions expressed in this article are the author's own and do not reflect the view of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the Department of Commerce, or the United States government Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Maryland su: Elasticity (Economics) Fraud Criminal procedure Prices Groundfishes sug: subj: Elasticity (Economics) Fraud Criminal procedure Prices Salt water fishing Groundfishes keyword: fraud mislabeling multispecies seafood transferable quota fraud mislabeling multispecies seafood transferable quota ab: We study incentives to mislabel output in multispecies fisheries managed by tradeable catch shares. Firms can save quota costs by misreporting species harvested, as seen in criminal proceedings against the Codfather. We show that price elasticities for the abundant species reported in the cheating will be higher for compliant than non‐compliant firms. Using data from the New England groundfish fishery, we test this prediction using a latent class hedonic price equation to identify compliant versus non‐compliant firms. We then estimate multi‐output technologies for compliant and noncompliant firms to identify differences in substitution possibilities. Our empirical results align with theoretical expectations and are robust to placebo tests. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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