No-'How' Privileged Self-Knowledge.
Ordinarily, if a person produces a nonreflective, 'unstudied' self-attribution of a present mental state – an avowal – we do not presume that they have produced the avowal on some specific epistemic basis; and we do not expect them to know how they know the self-attribution to be true. This no-'how'...
| Publicado en: | Erkenntnis Vol. 89; no. 8; pp. 3203 - 3228 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Dec2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=180628815&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 180628815 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01650106 5KZ jtl: Erkenntnis issn: 01650106 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2024 vid: 89 iid: 8 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 180628815 10.1007/s10670-023-00674-7 ppf: 3203 ppct: 25 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1012KB tig: atl: No-'How' Privileged Self-Knowledge. aug: au: Bar-On, Dorit affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Connecticut, Storrs, 344 Mansfield Road, Unit 1054, 06269-1054, Storrs, CT, USA su: Expressivism (Ethics) sug: subj: Expressivism (Ethics) keyword: Avowals Baseless beliefs Constitutivism Neo-expressivism Self-knolwedge ab: Ordinarily, if a person produces a nonreflective, 'unstudied' self-attribution of a present mental state – an avowal – we do not presume that they have produced the avowal on some specific epistemic basis; and we do not expect them to know how they know the self-attribution to be true. This no-'how' character of basic self-knowledge is puzzling, given that we regard avowals as manifesting factual, and indeed privileged, knowledge. I am here interested in views that accommodate both the baseless, no-'how' and the factual, privileged character of basic self-knowledge. I argue that leading constitutivist views, which embrace both, fail properly to meet the doxastic (as opposed to justificatory) requirement on basic self-knowledge, thereby failing to preserve its genuinely factual character. I then argue that an alternative, neo-expressivist approach is better placed to meet the doxastic requirement, as well as being at least as well-placed as constitutivist views to address the justificatory requirement on baseless self-knowledge. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2024. All Rights Reserved. item: Erkenntnis holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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