Institutions Are Not Rules: Realigning the Ontology Behind Theories of Change.
Historical institutionalism has fruitfully moved beyond its initial focus on institutional effects to incorporate change. I argue, however, that the resulting advances have become misaligned with their conceptual bases. "Institutions as rules" was a useful first approximation, but it cannot accommod...
| Publicado en: | Political Studies Vol. 72; no. 4; pp. 1512 - 1534 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Sage Publications Inc.
Nov2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=180675817&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 180675817 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00323217 PSZ jtl: Political Studies issn: 00323217 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Nov2024 vid: 72 iid: 4 pid: 344 pub: Sage Publications Inc. artinfo: ui: 180675817 10.1177/00323217231179551 ppf: 1512 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T db: hlh ui: 180675817 – @attributes: type: P db: hlh ui: 180675817 tig: atl: Institutions Are Not Rules: Realigning the Ontology Behind Theories of Change. aug: au: Castro, Henrique A affil: Center for Law and Political Economy (NUDEP), Fundação Getúlio Vargas São Paulo Law School", São Paulo, Brazil su: Historical institutionalism (Sociology) Ontology Literature Expertise Explanation sug: subj: Historical institutionalism (Sociology) Ontology Literature Expertise Explanation keyword: collective intentionality critical realism institutional change legal expressivism legal institutions collective intentionality critical realism institutional change legal expressivism legal institutions ab: Historical institutionalism has fruitfully moved beyond its initial focus on institutional effects to incorporate change. I argue, however, that the resulting advances have become misaligned with their conceptual bases. "Institutions as rules" was a useful first approximation, but it cannot accommodate changes in institutionalized practices occurring while sources of law remain the same. I propose reconceiving legal rules (material objects) and institutions (behavioral dispositions) as distinct elements that nonetheless remain fundamentally associated through the belief-shaping actions of specific groups. While rules change with the introduction of officially recognized materials, legal institutions change in response to new beliefs regarding what could pass as officially permissible. Far from a mere exercise in conceptual precision, the proposals draw distinctions that matter for description and explanation. In that regard, I show how the current literature mischaracterizes court-led change and how we might advance on the underexplored issue of collective meaning-making amidst unequal legal expertise. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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