A Revision on Waldron's Autonomy Defense of Moral Rights.
The argument I defend in this paper challenges whether Waldron's explanation of the conditions required for a moral right to satisfy its autonomy-promoting function is the best one available. It questions the suitability of Waldron's preferred taxonomy of moral action, where acts are divided into: (...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Value Inquiry Vol. 58; no. 4; pp. 583 - 600 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Dec2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=180735070&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 180735070 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00225363 OJ8 jtl: Journal of Value Inquiry issn: 00225363 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2024 vid: 58 iid: 4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 180735070 10.1007/s10790-022-09912-7 ppf: 583 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 685KB tig: atl: A Revision on Waldron's Autonomy Defense of Moral Rights. aug: au: Callaghan, Geoffrey D affil: https://ror.org/01gw3d370 Department of Political Science, University of Windsor, Windsor, ON, Canada su: Spheres Taxonomy Autonomy (Philosophy) Argument Classification sug: subj: Spheres Taxonomy Autonomy (Philosophy) Argument Classification ab: The argument I defend in this paper challenges whether Waldron's explanation of the conditions required for a moral right to satisfy its autonomy-promoting function is the best one available. It questions the suitability of Waldron's preferred taxonomy of moral action, where acts are divided into: (1) those that are morally required; (2) those that are morally prohibited; and (3) those that are morally indifferent, advocating instead for a binary classification consisting of: (a) actions that admit of reasonable moral disagreement; and (b) actions that do not admit of reasonable moral disagreement. My claim is that the protective sphere moral rights set up in organizing the moral relations among persons is applicable only to the former category—namely, actions that admit of reasonable moral disagreement. Actions that do not admit of reasonable moral disagreement will either: (b') not normally demand a right against interference in the first place (if the action is unquestionably permissible); or (b") fail to admit of a right against interference at all (if the action is unquestionably impermissible). This competing explanation allows us to preserve the autonomy-promoting conception of moral rights Waldron endorses while avoiding a number of its suspect implications. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Journal of Value Inquiry is a copyright of Springer, 2024. All Rights Reserved. item: Journal of Value Inquiry holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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