The Problem of Modal Epistemic Friction, Similarity, Essence and Induction.

Vaidya & Wallner [2021] have recently formulated the Problem of Modal Epistemic Friction (PMEF) for three of the most discussed accounts in the epistemology of modality: conceivability-based, counterfactual-based and deduction-based accounts. They propose essentialist solutions in all three cases, a...

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Published in:Disputatio: International Journal of Philosophy Vol. 15; no. 69; pp. 179 - 203
Main Author: Wallner, Michael
Format: Article
Published: Paradigm Publishing Services Nov2023
Subjects:
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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      dt: Nov2023
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        atl: The Problem of Modal Epistemic Friction, Similarity, Essence and Induction.
      aug:
        au: Wallner, Michael
        affil: University of Graz
      su:
        Essentialism (Philosophy)
        Friction
        Theory of knowledge
      sug:
        subj:
          Essentialism (Philosophy)
          Friction
          Theory of knowledge
      keyword:
        epistemic friction
        epistemology of modality
        essence
        induction
        modality
        similarity
      ab: Vaidya & Wallner [2021] have recently formulated the Problem of Modal Epistemic Friction (PMEF) for three of the most discussed accounts in the epistemology of modality: conceivability-based, counterfactual-based and deduction-based accounts. They propose essentialist solutions in all three cases, arguing that all three discussed accounts should be supplemented by a suitable epistemology of essence. In this paper I argue that the PMEF also applies to Roca-Royes' similarity-based account in the epistemology of modality. I also discuss if or to what extent the version of the PMEF that applies to Roca-Royes can be given an essentialist solution. With regard to this question, I argue that besides the inductivist variant of the similarity-based account that Roca-Royes favors, there might also be an essentialist variant that would be successful in at least some cases. As for Roca-Royes' inductivist variant I argue that the PMEF ultimately boils down to the notorious Problem of Induction. I shall discuss a popular solution to the Problem of Induction and the role essences might play in it.
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    language: English
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