Calibrating and Bootstrapping Modal Judgment.

In this paper, I consider the question of whether calibration is required for modalizing mechanisms to be reliable, that is, whether it is necessary for modalizing mechanisms to be adjusted to prevent overgeneration and undergeneration of modal beliefs. I first argue that the calibration requirement...

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Publicado en:Disputatio: International Journal of Philosophy Vol. 15; no. 69; pp. 250 - 267
Autor principal: Carbonell, Felipe Morales
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Paradigm Publishing Services Nov2023
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: Carbonell, Felipe Morales
        affil: University of Chile
      su:
        Social epistemology
        Judgment (Psychology)
        Perspective taking
        Calibration
      sug:
        subj:
          Social epistemology
          Judgment (Psychology)
          Perspective taking
          Calibration
      keyword:
        bootstrapping
        calibration
        modalizing mechanisms
        naturalistic modal epistemology
        social modal epistemology
      ab: In this paper, I consider the question of whether calibration is required for modalizing mechanisms to be reliable, that is, whether it is necessary for modalizing mechanisms to be adjusted to prevent overgeneration and undergeneration of modal beliefs. I first argue that the calibration requirement affects differently what I call bootstrapping and ordinary cases. Identifying different ways in which a modalizing mechanism could be calibrated, I argue that not all of them are effective or even viable in bootstrapping cases. Then, by taking a diachronic perspective, I offer a simplified account of how different calibration mechanisms can be bootstrapped, with an emphasis on the social dimension of modal judgment.
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    language: English
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