Hume's Externalist Gambit.
I examine three arguments that purport to show that connectionist, associationist architectures cannot achieve key features of human thought. Hume anticipated each of these three arguments and provided a unified strategy for responding to each, the "externalist gambit." On this account, external nat...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 91; no. 5; pp. 1296 - 1306 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Dec2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=180968269&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 180968269 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2024 vid: 91 iid: 5 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 180968269 10.1017/psa.2023.139 ppf: 1296 ppct: 10 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 171KB tig: atl: Hume's Externalist Gambit. aug: au: Clatterbuck, Hayley affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA su: Natural languages Argument Human beings sug: subj: Natural languages Argument Human beings ab: I examine three arguments that purport to show that connectionist, associationist architectures cannot achieve key features of human thought. Hume anticipated each of these three arguments and provided a unified strategy for responding to each, the "externalist gambit." On this account, external natural language provides the necessary structure for associationist systems to achieve those features of thought that their opponents take them to lack. The externalist gambit provides a promising avenue for today's defenders of connectionism about the human mind. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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