Thomas Kuhn's Quasi‐Fideism.
Abstract: I argue that Kuhn's account of scientific practice is profitably understood as a kind of hinge epistemology: like our epistemic practices more generally, scientific inquiry is made possible precisely by the fact that certain things are not subject to doubt. In Kuhn's own words, 'dogmatism'...
| Publicado en: | Heythrop Journal Vol. 65; no. 6; pp. 645 - 662 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Nov2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=180972677&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 180972677 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00181196 D84 jtl: Heythrop Journal issn: 00181196 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Nov2024 vid: 65 iid: 6 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 180972677 10.1111/heyj.14369 ppf: 645 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 200KB tig: atl: Thomas Kuhn's Quasi‐Fideism. aug: au: Marré, Thomas affil: The School of Philosophy, The Catholic University of America su: Kuhn, Thomas S., 1922-1996 Theory of knowledge Scientific method Dogmatism Analogy sug: subj: Kuhn, Thomas S., 1922-1996 Theory of knowledge Scientific method Dogmatism Analogy ab: Abstract: I argue that Kuhn's account of scientific practice is profitably understood as a kind of hinge epistemology: like our epistemic practices more generally, scientific inquiry is made possible precisely by the fact that certain things are not subject to doubt. In Kuhn's own words, 'dogmatism' is essential to scientific practice and one of the primary engines of its success. For this reason, I argue that Kuhn's account is a rich source for reflection on the relationship between faith and reason. At the same time, Kuhn has faced objections similar to those which have faced hinge‐epistemologists: how can disputes grounded in different, incompatible 'dogmas' be rationally resolved? Kuhn's response is similar to one put forward by Duncan Pritchard, but is, I argue, an improvement on it. In particular, the hinges on which deep scientific disagreement turns are for Kuhn certain shared values in light of which debate is possible. The choice among competing dogmas can, I argue, be understood on analogy with a prudential judgement of practical reasoning, i.e., an exercise of phronēsis. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Heythrop Journal is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Heythrop Journal holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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