Speech Acts and Reasonableness in Pragma-Dialectics.
We begin by explaining why formulating the pragma-dialectical (henceforth PD) account of argumentation in terms of some central notions of speech act theory, as Frans van Eemeren and Ton van Haaften (Argumentation 37:341–376, 2023) propose, fails. We go on to suggest that this failure reveals a deep...
| Publicado en: | Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy Vol. 43; no. 4; pp. 1287 - 1295 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Oct2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=180990353&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 180990353 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01677411 NM2 jtl: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy issn: 01677411 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2024 vid: 43 iid: 4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 180990353 10.1007/s11245-024-10081-4 ppf: 1287 ppct: 8 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 633KB tig: atl: Speech Acts and Reasonableness in Pragma-Dialectics. aug: au: Biro, John Siegel, Harvey affil: https://ror.org/02y3ad647 University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA https://ror.org/02dgjyy92 University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL, USA su: Argument Discourse sug: subj: Argument Discourse keyword: Argumentation Pragma-dialectics Reasonableness Speech act theory ab: We begin by explaining why formulating the pragma-dialectical (henceforth PD) account of argumentation in terms of some central notions of speech act theory, as Frans van Eemeren and Ton van Haaften (Argumentation 37:341–376, 2023) propose, fails. We go on to suggest that this failure reveals a deeper problem with the theory, one that makes it impossible for it to meet what van Eemeren and van Haaften recognize as the most important requirement for it. They say "The crucial problem in the study of argumentation therefore is how maintaining reasonableness in argumentative discourse can lead to effective convincingness." (Argumentation 37:341–376, 2023, p. 3) But on a proper understanding of what it is for an argument to be reasonable, this circle cannot be squared, since reasonableness and convincingness vary independently. A reasonable argument does not always convince, nor is one that does always reasonable. If this is, indeed, the crucial problem for pragma-dialectics, we will argue that it cannot be solved in the way that PD proposes. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy is a copyright of Springer, 2024. All Rights Reserved. item: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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