Is There a Possible World in which Imagining Zombies Can Shed Light on Our Understanding of Consciousness?
In this article I criticize the explanatory reductionism underlying the zombie argument from the point of view of the philosophy of science. I argue that it is a thesis that finds no support in the available models of reduction, a thesis that is based on an unfounded idealization of the natural scie...
| Publicado en: | Teorema Vol. 43; no. 3; pp. 63 - 79 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Teorema
2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=181080678&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 181080678 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 02101602 IHG jtl: Teorema issn: 02101602 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: 2024 vid: 43 iid: 3 pid: 20677 pub: Teorema artinfo: ui: 181080678 10.30827/trif.32734 ppf: 63 ppct: 16 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 1.6MB tig: atl: Is There a Possible World in which Imagining Zombies Can Shed Light on Our Understanding of Consciousness? aug: au: Arias Domínguez, Asier affil: Departamento de Lógica y Filosofía Teórica Universidad Complutense de Madrid Ciudad Universitaria, 28040 Madrid su: Philosophy of science Consciousness Materialism Possibility Argument sug: subj: Philosophy of science Consciousness Materialism Possibility Argument keyword: Modal Arguments Physicalism Reductionism Zombies argumentos modales conciencia fisicalismo reduccionismo zombis ab: In this article I criticize the explanatory reductionism underlying the zombie argument from the point of view of the philosophy of science. I argue that it is a thesis that finds no support in the available models of reduction, a thesis that is based on an unfounded idealization of the natural sciences and that depends on an uncertain appeal to the possibility in principle of a future unified physics. I conclude that the uncertain character of these assumptions calls for a reassessment, not only of the implications of this type of argument for methodological naturalism but also of the role such arguments play in the study of consciousness. En este artículo critico el reduccionismo explicativo que subyace al argumento zombi desde el punto de vista de la filosofía de la ciencia. Defiendo que se trata de una tesis que no encuentra sustento en los modelos disponibles de reducción, una tesis que está basada en una idealización infundada de las ciencias naturales y que depende de una incierta apelación a la posibilidad en principio de una futura física unificada. Concluyo que el carácter incierto de estos supuestos invita a una reconsideración no sólo de las implicaciones de este tipo de argumentos para el naturalismo metodológico, sino también del papel que los mismos desempeñan en el estudio de la conciencia. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Teorema is the property of Teorema and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Teorema holder: Teorema dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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