Approval, reflective emotions, and virtue: sentimentalist elements in Husserl's philosophy.
In this paper, I focus on Edmund Husserl's analyses of the act of approval and the role he attributes to it in his ethics. I show that we can deepen our understanding of both if we rely on his critical reflections on Shaftesbury's theory of affections in his lecture course Einleitung in die Ethik. T...
| Publicado en: | British Journal for the History of Philosophy Vol. 32; no. 6; pp. 1329 - 1350 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Taylor & Francis Ltd
Dec2024
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=181234024&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 181234024 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 09608788 5AX jtl: British Journal for the History of Philosophy issn: 09608788 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2024 vid: 32 iid: 6 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 181234024 10.1080/09608788.2023.2274636 ppf: 1329 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.4MB tig: atl: Approval, reflective emotions, and virtue: sentimentalist elements in Husserl's philosophy. aug: au: Carta, Emanuela affil: Institute of Philosophy, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium su: Husserl, Edmund, 1859-1938 Philosophy Virtue Emotions Ethics sug: subj: Husserl, Edmund, 1859-1938 Philosophy Virtue Emotions Ethics keyword: approval Husserl reflective emotions Shaftesbury virtue ab: In this paper, I focus on Edmund Husserl's analyses of the act of approval and the role he attributes to it in his ethics. I show that we can deepen our understanding of both if we rely on his critical reflections on Shaftesbury's theory of affections in his lecture course Einleitung in die Ethik. The sections of this course devoted to Shaftesbury are the only place in Husserl's later philosophical production where he addresses the need to clarify the nature of approval from a phenomenological point of view and provides precise indications about the role that such emotions play in our life. I thereby examine Husserl's criticisms of Shaftesbury's account of reflective emotions, and I compare these criticisms with Husserl's account of approval in the texts from the Konvolut über Billigung collected in the Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins. I argue that, according to Husserl, approval is an essential but not sufficient component in the pursuit of virtue. The upshot is that crucial parts of Husserl's ethics come from a radical and original reworking of central notions of the early modern sentimentalist tradition. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of British Journal for the History of Philosophy is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: British Journal for the History of Philosophy holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|