Kant on phenomenal substance.
In this paper, I offer a systematic account of Kant's view on 'phenomenal substance'. Several studies have recently analysed Kant's notion of substance. However, I submit that more needs to be said about how this notion is reconceptualized within the critical framework to vindicate a genuine and leg...
| Publicado en: | British Journal for the History of Philosophy Vol. 32; no. 6; pp. 1305 - 1329 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Dec2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=181234025&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 181234025 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 09608788 5AX jtl: British Journal for the History of Philosophy issn: 09608788 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2024 vid: 32 iid: 6 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 181234025 10.1080/09608788.2023.2299780 ppf: 1305 ppct: 24 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.6MB tig: atl: Kant on phenomenal substance. aug: au: Spagnesi, Lorenzo affil: Department of Philosophy, Universität Trier, Trier, Germany su: Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 Realism Idealism Ethics Philosophy sug: subj: Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 Realism Idealism Ethics Philosophy keyword: empirical realism Kant relational properties space substance ab: In this paper, I offer a systematic account of Kant's view on 'phenomenal substance'. Several studies have recently analysed Kant's notion of substance. However, I submit that more needs to be said about how this notion is reconceptualized within the critical framework to vindicate a genuine and legitimate sense of substance in the phenomenal realm. More specifically, I show that Kant's transcendental idealism does not commit him to a rejection of substantiality in phenomena. Rather, Kant isolates a general notion of substance (as ultimate subject) and argues that (i) the relationality of phenomena is compatible with this notion; and that (ii) matter and all its parts are the ultimate subjects of everything existing in space (as what is independently movable in space). I suggest that vindicating a genuine and legitimate notion of phenomenal substance has far-ranging consequences for the interpretation of Kant's empirical realism. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of British Journal for the History of Philosophy is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: British Journal for the History of Philosophy holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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