RULE-CIRCULARITY AND THE JUSTIFICATION OF DEDUCTION.
I examine Paul Boghossian's recent attempt to argue for scepticism about logical rules. I argue that certain rule-and proof-theoretic considerations can avert such scepticism. Boghossian's ‘Tonk Argument’ seeks to justify the rule of tonk-introduction by using the rule itself. The argument is subjec...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 55; no. 221; pp. 625 - 649 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Oct2005
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=18139295&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 18139295 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318094 PHQ jtl: Philosophical Quarterly issn: 00318094 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2005 vid: 55 iid: 221 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 18139295 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00420.x ppf: 625 ppct: 24 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 134KB tig: atl: RULE-CIRCULARITY AND THE JUSTIFICATION OF DEDUCTION. aug: au: Tennant, Neil affil: The Ohio State University su: Boghossian, Paul Logic Skepticism Philosophy Belief & doubt sug: subj: Boghossian, Paul Logic Skepticism Philosophy Belief & doubt ab: I examine Paul Boghossian's recent attempt to argue for scepticism about logical rules. I argue that certain rule-and proof-theoretic considerations can avert such scepticism. Boghossian's ‘Tonk Argument’ seeks to justify the rule of tonk-introduction by using the rule itself. The argument is subjected here to more detailed proof-theoretic scrutiny than Boghossian undertook. Its sole axiom, the so-called Meaning Postulate for tonk, is shown to be false or devoid of content. It is also shown that the rules of Disquotation and of Semantic Ascent cannot be derived for sentences with tonk dominant. These considerations deprive Boghossian's scepticism of its support. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: © 2019 Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St. Andrews. item: Philosophical Quarterly holder: Oxford University Press / USA dt: @attributes: year: 2005 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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