On Philip Goff's case for agentive cosmopsychism.
Recently, Philip Goff has argued that the idea of agentive cosmopsychism is the best explanation of cosmic fine-tuning. This idea suggests that our universe is a conscious subject which has capacity to recognize and respond to reasons or facts about value. In this article, by carefully examining the...
| Publicado en: | International Journal for Philosophy of Religion Vol. 96; no. 3; pp. 199 - 222 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Dec2024
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | Recently, Philip Goff has argued that the idea of agentive cosmopsychism is the best explanation of cosmic fine-tuning. This idea suggests that our universe is a conscious subject which has capacity to recognize and respond to reasons or facts about value. In this article, by carefully examining the involved premises in Goff's argument, we show that two important premises are dubious and not rationally acceptable. Therefore, we conclude that Goff's argument for agentive cosmopsychism fails. |
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