THE MORTAL SUBJECT OF RADICAL REFLECTION: self-consciousness, sociality, and politics in merleau-ponty.
This article reconsiders the concept of radical reflection in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception, arguing that, in its decentring of the subject who engages in reflection, radical reflection intimates a distinct theory of this very subject – one which will be developed in the final section...
| Publicado en: | Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities Vol. 29; no. 6; pp. 3 - 19 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Dec2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
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