Voluntary disclosure of verifiable information with general preferences and information endowment uncertainty.
We study a voluntary disclosure model with verifiable information, a range of sender and receiver preferences, and uncertainty about whether the sender is informed. When a sender's preferences are insensitive to the state relative to the receiver's, a sender discloses moderate news and suppresses ex...
| Publicado en: | RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 55; no. 4; pp. 519 - 550 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
Dec2024
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=181730987&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 181730987 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 07416261 56RJ jtl: RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) issn: 07416261 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Dec2024 vid: 55 iid: 4 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 181730987 10.1111/1756-2171.12483 ppf: 519 ppct: 31 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 797KB tig: atl: Voluntary disclosure of verifiable information with general preferences and information endowment uncertainty. aug: au: Hummel, Patrick Morgan, John Stocken, Phillip C. affil: Microsoft University of California—Berkeley Dartmouth College su: Disclosure Endowments Equilibrium sug: subj: Disclosure Grantmaking Foundations Endowments Equilibrium ab: We study a voluntary disclosure model with verifiable information, a range of sender and receiver preferences, and uncertainty about whether the sender is informed. When a sender's preferences are insensitive to the state relative to the receiver's, a sender discloses moderate news and suppresses extreme news. We also find a partial revelation equilibrium where the sender's message is an interval containing the realized state. When a sender's preferences are sensitive to the state relative to the receiver's, the sender withholds moderate news and discloses extreme news. The latter disclosure is more consistent with extant empirical findings about voluntary managerial disclosure. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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