Cover Image
QR Code

Knowing that as knowing how: a neurocognitive practicalism.

We defend a new, neurocognitive version of the view that knowing that is a form of knowing how and its manifestation. Specifically, we argue that knowing that P is knowing how to represent the fact that P, ground such a representation in the fact that P, use such a representation to guide action wit...

Full description

Published in:Synthese Vol. 205; no. 1; pp. 1 - 32
Main Authors: Piccinini, Gualtiero, Hetherington, Stephen
Format: Article
Published: Springer Nature Jan2025
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=181827132&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: hlh
    uiTerm: 181827132
    longDbName: Humanities International Complete
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        00397857
        4LI
      jtl: Synthese
      issn: 00397857
      maglogo: N
    pubinfo:
      dt: Jan2025
      vid: 205
      iid: 1
      pid: 237
      pub: Springer Nature
    artinfo:
      ui:
        181827132
        10.1007/s11229-024-04843-1
      ppf: 1
      ppct: 31
      formats:
        fmt:
          – @attributes:
              type: T
          – @attributes:
              type: P
              size: 1.2MB
      tig:
        atl: Knowing that as knowing how: a neurocognitive practicalism.
      aug:
        au:
          Piccinini, Gualtiero
          Hetherington, Stephen
        affil:
          https://ror.org/02ymw8z06 University of Missouri, Columbia, MO, USA
          https://ror.org/03r8z3t63 University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia
      su: Knowledge representation (Information theory)
      sug:
        subj: Knowledge representation (Information theory)
      keyword:
        Action
        Intellectualism
        Knowledge
        Knowledge-how
        Representation
      ab: We defend a new, neurocognitive version of the view that knowing that is a form of knowing how and its manifestation. Specifically, we argue that knowing that P is knowing how to represent the fact that P, ground such a representation in the fact that P, use such a representation to guide action with respect to P when needed, store traces of such representations, and exercising the relevant know-how. More precisely, agents acquire knowledge via their neurocognitive systems and neurocognitive systems control organisms by building internal models of their environments and using such models to guide action. Such internal models implicitly represent how things are. When agents' implicit internal models are grounded in the fact that P and are usable for guiding action with respect to P, agents have implicit knowledge that P. When agents acquire the additional capacity to manipulate language, they also acquire the capacity to explicitly represent and express that the world is thus-and-so. When agents' explicit internal models are appropriately grounded in the fact that P and are usable for guiding action with respect to P, agents have explicit knowledge that P. Thus, both implicit and explicit knowing that P are forms of knowing how to represent that P, ground such a representation in P, use such a representation to guide action with respect to P when needed, store traces of such representations, and exercising the relevant know-how.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: Y
      custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2025. All Rights Reserved.
      item: Synthese
      holder: Springer Nature
      dt:
        @attributes:
          year: 2025
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N