The corporate legality game a lab experiment on the impact of policies, frames and information.
A company engaging in illicit practices can undermine competitors operating within legal boundaries, ultimately eroding the public good of legality and integrity. Recently established institutional legality ratings aim to address this issue. We investigate the impact of these ratings through a rando...
| Publicado en: | Crime, Law & Social Change Vol. 82; no. 5; pp. 1213 - 1254 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Dec2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=181926708&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 181926708 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 09254994 CRG jtl: Crime, Law & Social Change issn: 09254994 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2024 vid: 82 iid: 5 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 181926708 10.1007/s10611-024-10163-9 ppf: 1213 ppct: 41 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.3MB tig: atl: The corporate legality game a lab experiment on the impact of policies, frames and information. aug: au: Becchetti, Leonardo Pelligra, Vittorio Rossetti, Fiammetta affil: https://ror.org/02p77k626 Department of Economics, University of Rome Tor Vergata, Via Columbia 2, 00133, Rome, Italy https://ror.org/003109y17 Department of Economics and Business, University of Cagliari. V.E S, Ignazio 17, 09123, Cagliari, Italy https://ror.org/05f950310 Faculty of Economics and Business, KU Leuven, Naamsestraat 69, 3000, Louvain, Belgium su: Cultural policy Consumers Fiscal policy Nash equilibrium Information design sug: subj: Cultural policy Consumers Fiscal policy Administration of General Economic Programs Public Finance Activities Nash equilibrium Information design keyword: C7 C92 Conformity Corruption H2 Laboratory Experiment Redistribution C7 C92 Conformity Corruption H2 Laboratory Experiment Redistribution ab: A company engaging in illicit practices can undermine competitors operating within legal boundaries, ultimately eroding the public good of legality and integrity. Recently established institutional legality ratings aim to address this issue. We investigate the impact of these ratings through a randomized experiment simulating redistributive policies. These policies tax "defectors" (buyers of unrated products) and benefit "co-operators" (buyers of legality-rated products) to promote legality and combat corruption. Our findings show that redistribution mechanisms, the legality frame, and conformity information design significantly mitigate the Prisoner's Dilemma, leading to notable deviations from the Nash Equilibrium. Concerning anti-corruption strategies, our results suggest that consumer willingness to pay for legality can be substantially boosted by redistribution policies and cultural processes inducing conformity to legality norms. This study highlights how legality ratings issued by institutions, when effectively communicated to consumers and combined with redistribution actions, can increase demand for legal products. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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