Perspectival realism and frequentist statistics: the case of Jerzy Neyman’s methodology and philosophy.
In this article I investigate the extent to which perspectival realism (PR) agrees with frequentist statistical methodology and philosophy, with an emphasis on J. Neyman’s frequentist statistical methods and philosophy. PR is clarified in the context of frequentist statistics. Based on the example o...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 205; no. 1; pp. 1 - 30 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jan2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=181966733&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 181966733 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2025 vid: 205 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 181966733 10.1007/s11229-024-04842-2 ppf: 1 ppct: 29 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.6MB tig: atl: Perspectival realism and frequentist statistics: the case of Jerzy Neyman’s methodology and philosophy. aug: au: Kubiak, Adam P. affil: https://ror.org/00y0xnp53 Faculty of Administration and Social Sciences, Warsaw University of Technology, Pl. Politechniki 1, 00-661, Warszawa, Poland sug: keyword: Frequentism Mathematical Sciences Statistics Philosophy and Religious Studies Philosophy Models Philosophy of science Scientific perspective Scientific realism Statistics ab: In this article I investigate the extent to which perspectival realism (PR) agrees with frequentist statistical methodology and philosophy, with an emphasis on J. Neyman’s frequentist statistical methods and philosophy. PR is clarified in the context of frequentist statistics. Based on the example of the stopping rule problem, PR is shown to be able to naturally be associated with frequentist statistics in general. I show that there are explicit and implicit aspects of Neyman’s methods and philosophy that are incompatible and both partially agree and disagree with PR. Additionally, I provide clarifications and interpretations to make Neyman’s methods and philosophy more coherent with the realist aspect of PR. Furthermore, I deliver an argument that, based on Neyman’s methods and philosophy, one is dealing with genuine and non-trivial perspectives. I argue that, despite Neyman being a normative anti-pluralist, there are some elements of perspectival pluralism present in his methods and philosophy. In conclusion, firstly, due to their ambivalence, Neyman’s conceptions align more closely with PR than with alternative, less moderate stances. Secondly, from the perspective of the statistical approach analysed, PR should be treated as a descriptive rather than a normative position, and as case (or aspect)-dependent, rather than a universal, absolute, or binding stance. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2025. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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