The epistemic problem of singular causation.
It has been argued that intuition, perception and mechanistic rationales generate knowledge of singular causation unambiguously supporting the metaphysical view that causation is a local relationship between individual events. The analysis conducted in this paper contradicts this line of reasoning....
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 205; no. 1; pp. 1 - 20 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jan2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=181966739&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 181966739 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2025 vid: 205 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 181966739 10.1007/s11229-024-04876-6 ppf: 1 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 884KB tig: atl: The epistemic problem of singular causation. aug: au: Baetu, Tudor M. affil: https://ror.org/02xrw9r68 Département de Philosophie et des arts, Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières, 3351, boul. des Forges, G8Z 4M3, Trois-Rivières, Québec, Canada sug: keyword: Cognitive science Mechanism Philosophy of biology Singular causation ab: It has been argued that intuition, perception and mechanistic rationales generate knowledge of singular causation unambiguously supporting the metaphysical view that causation is a local relationship between individual events. The analysis conducted in this paper contradicts this line of reasoning. Intuition, perception and mechanistic rationales rely, tacitly or explicitly, on prior contrasts between patterns describing populations of events. The fact that verdicts about singular causation are often reached in light of statistical, abductive or extrapolative inferences that are liable to error further entails that knowledge of singular causation is less certain than the knowledge of patterns and group-level difference-making dependencies from which it is derived. This indicates that claims about singular causation are not commonsense truisms, but complex epistemic constructs that should be approached more critically, especially if such claims are meant to guide action. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2025. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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