Possible Worlds as Propositions.
Realists about possible worlds typically identify possible worlds with abstract objects, such as propositions or properties. However, they face a significant objection due to Lewis (1986), to the effect that there is no way to explain how possible worlds-as-abstract objects represent possibilities....
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 75; no. 1; pp. 21 - 40 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Jan2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=181987717&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 181987717 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318094 PHQ jtl: Philosophical Quarterly issn: 00318094 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2025 vid: 75 iid: 1 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 181987717 10.1093/pq/pqad106 ppf: 21 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 480KB tig: atl: Possible Worlds as Propositions. aug: au: Deasy, Daniel affil: University College Dublin, Ireland su: Proposition (Logic) Lewis, David K. (David Kellogg), 1941-2001 Realism Metaphysics Abstract thought sug: subj: Proposition (Logic) Lewis, David K. (David Kellogg), 1941-2001 Realism Metaphysics Abstract thought keyword: higher-order metaphysics metaphysics modal realism modality possible worlds propositions ab: Realists about possible worlds typically identify possible worlds with abstract objects, such as propositions or properties. However, they face a significant objection due to Lewis (1986), to the effect that there is no way to explain how possible worlds-as-abstract objects represent possibilities. In this paper, I describe a response to this objection on behalf of realists. The response is to identify possible worlds with propositions, but to deny that propositions are abstract objects, or indeed objects at all. Instead, I argue that realists should follow Prior (1971) and others in treating higher-order quantification (e.g. quantification into predicate or sentence position) as a genuine form of quantification in its own right, and so in particular, not to be analysed in terms of first-order quantification over abstract objects. I argue that from this 'higher-orderist' perspective, there is a relatively straightforward answer to the question of how possible worlds-as-propositions succeed in representing possibilities. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: © 2019 Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St. Andrews. item: Philosophical Quarterly holder: Oxford University Press / USA dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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