Disequilibrium Play in Tennis.

Do the world's best tennis pros play Nash equilibrium mixed strategies? We answer this question using data on serve-direction choices (to the receiver's left, right, or body) from the Match Charting Project. Using a new approach, we test and reject a key implication of a mixed-strategy Nash equilibr...

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Publicado en:Journal of Political Economy Vol. 133; no. 1; pp. 190 - 252
Autores principales: Anderson, Axel, Rosen, Jeremy, Rust, John, Wong, Kin-Ping
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: University of Chicago Press Jan2025
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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      dt: Jan2025
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      pub: University of Chicago Press
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        atl: Disequilibrium Play in Tennis.
      aug:
        au:
          Anderson, Axel
          Rosen, Jeremy
          Rust, John
          Wong, Kin-Ping
        affil:
          Georgetown University
          Digonex
      su:
        Nash equilibrium
        Dynamic programming
        Tennis
        Probability theory
      sug:
        subj:
          Nash equilibrium
          Dynamic programming
          Tennis
          Probability theory
      ab: Do the world's best tennis pros play Nash equilibrium mixed strategies? We answer this question using data on serve-direction choices (to the receiver's left, right, or body) from the Match Charting Project. Using a new approach, we test and reject a key implication of a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium: that the probability of winning the service game is identical for all possible serve strategies. We calculate best-response serve strategies by dynamic programming (DP) and show that for most elite pro servers, the DP strategy significantly increases their win probability relative to the mixed strategies they actually use.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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