Generic episodic memories.

Remembering one’s past generically is a rather ordinary feature of mental life. I can recall my daily commute to campus, from my past perspective on my bicycle, without thereby picking out one specific occasion on which I made that commute. Memories of this form have received little theoretical atte...

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Publicado en:Synthese Vol. 205; no. 1; pp. 1 - 27
Autor principal: Entwistle, Megan
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Jan2025
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Generic episodic memories.
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        au: Entwistle, Megan
        affil: https://ror.org/01yc7t268 Department of Philosophy, Washington University in St Louis, St Louis, MO, USA
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      keyword:
        Episodicity
        Event types
        Experiential knowledge
        Genericity
        Memory
        Psychology and Cognitive Sciences Psychology
        Representation
      ab: Remembering one’s past generically is a rather ordinary feature of mental life. I can recall my daily commute to campus, from my past perspective on my bicycle, without thereby picking out one specific occasion on which I made that commute. Memories of this form have received little theoretical attention in the philosophical literature, in part because it is difficult to see how to divorce episodic modes of representation from representational uniqueness. The current paper makes progress on the question of how an episodic memory could have for its intentional object something that is not a unique episode. It proposes an analysis of generic episodic memories on which the remembering subject represents an event type. Genericity over episodes is best explained in terms of the subject’s knowledge of what it was like to experience events of that type.
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    language: English
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