Autonomised harming: Autonomised harming: L. Eggert.
This paper sketches elements of a theory of the ethics of autonomised harming: the phenomenon of delegating decisions about whether and whom to harm to artificial intelligence (AI) in self-driving cars and autonomous weapon systems. First, the paper elucidates the challenge of integrating non-human,...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 182; no. 1; pp. 1 - 25 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jan2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=182303657&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 182303657 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2025 vid: 182 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 182303657 10.1007/s11098-023-01990-y ppf: 1 ppct: 24 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 661KB tig: atl: Autonomised harming: Autonomised harming: L. Eggert. aug: au: Eggert, Linda affil: https://ror.org/052gg0110 Faculty of Philosophy and Balliol College, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK su: Harm (Ethics) Artificial intelligence Ethics Philosophy Justice sug: subj: Harm (Ethics) Artificial intelligence Ethics Philosophy Justice keyword: Ethics of AI Ethics of harming Non-consequentialist ethics Philosophy and Religious Studies Philosophy ab: This paper sketches elements of a theory of the ethics of autonomised harming: the phenomenon of delegating decisions about whether and whom to harm to artificial intelligence (AI) in self-driving cars and autonomous weapon systems. First, the paper elucidates the challenge of integrating non-human, artificial agents, which lack rights and duties, into our moral framework which relies on precisely these notions to determine the permissibility of harming. Second, the paper examines how potential differences between human agents and non-human, artificial agents might bear on the permissibility of delegating life-and death decisions to AI systems. Third, and finally, the paper explores a series of resulting complexities. These include the challenge of weighing autonomous systems' promise to reduce harm against the intrinsic value of rectificatory justice as well as the peculiar possibility that delegating harmful acts to AI might render ordinarily impermissible acts permissible. By illuminating what happens when we extend normative theory beyond its traditional boundaries, this discussion offers a starting point for assessing the moral permissibility of delegating consequential decisions to non-human, artificial agents. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2025. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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