The AI-design regress.

How should we design AI systems that make moral decisions that affect us? When there is disagreement about which moral decisions should be made and which methods would produce them, we should avoid arbitrary design choices. However, I show that this leads to a regress problem similar to the one meta...

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Publicado en:Philosophical Studies Vol. 182; no. 1; pp. 229 - 256
Autor principal: Robinson, Pamela
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Jan2025
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: The AI-design regress.
      aug:
        au: Robinson, Pamela
        affil: https://ror.org/03rmrcq20 University of British Columbia Okanagan, Kelowna, BC, Canada
      su:
        Artificial intelligence
        Uncertainty
        Ethics
        Normativity (Ethics)
        Designers
      sug:
        subj:
          Artificial intelligence
          Uncertainty
          Ethics
          Normativity (Ethics)
          Designers
      keyword:
        Moral disagreement
        Moral uncertainty
        Normative disagreement
        Normative uncertainty
        Regress
      ab: How should we design AI systems that make moral decisions that affect us? When there is disagreement about which moral decisions should be made and which methods would produce them, we should avoid arbitrary design choices. However, I show that this leads to a regress problem similar to the one metanormativists face involving higher orders of uncertainty. I argue that existing strategies for handling this parallel problem give verdicts about where to stop in the regress that are either too arbitrary or too difficult to implement. I propose a new strategy for AI designers that is better than these alternatives.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
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      src: R
    language: English
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