Schopenhauer on the Futility of Suicide.
Schopenhauer repeatedly claims that suicide is both foolish and futile. But while many commentators express sympathy for his charge of foolishness, most regard his charge of futility as indefensible even within his own system. In this paper, I offer a defence of Schopenhauer's futility charge, based...
| Published in: | Mind (0026-4423) Vol. 134; no. 533; pp. 171 - 191 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Jan2025
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=182368292&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 182368292 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00264423 MND jtl: Mind (0026-4423) issn: 00264423 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2025 vid: 134 iid: 533 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 182368292 10.1093/mind/fzae020 ppf: 171 ppct: 20 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 335KB tig: atl: Schopenhauer on the Futility of Suicide. aug: au: Marshall, Colin affil: University of Washington, USA su: Suicide Frustration Metaphysics Death Identity (Psychology) sug: subj: Suicide Frustration Metaphysics Death Identity (Psychology) ab: Schopenhauer repeatedly claims that suicide is both foolish and futile. But while many commentators express sympathy for his charge of foolishness, most regard his charge of futility as indefensible even within his own system. In this paper, I offer a defence of Schopenhauer's futility charge, based on metaphysical and psychological considerations. On the metaphysical front, Schopenhauer's view implies that psychological connections extend beyond the death of an individual. Drawing on Parfit's discussion of personal identity, I argue that those connections have personal significance, such that suicide does not allow one, as Hamlet hopes, simply 'not to be'. On the psychological front, I argue that a distinction between agents' intentions and underlying desires makes room for Schopenhauer's claim that paradigmatic suicidal agents ultimately desire the opposite of what suicide accomplishes. I conclude by showing how this understanding of futility can buttress Schopenhauer's charge of foolishness. My interpretation still leaves Schopenhauer vulnerable to certain objections, but shows that his account is more defensible than previous commentators have realized. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: © 2019 Mind Association. item: Mind (0026-4423) holder: Oxford University Press / USA dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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