Costly Signaling in Ancient Chinese Narratives.

Seemingly reckless, wasteful, or self-harming actions depicted in narrative sources are embedded in the philosophical and political discourse of Warring States and early imperial China (around the third to the first century bce). Signaling theory unveils the underlying rationality of many such acts...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Journal of Interdisciplinary History Vol. 55; no. 2; pp. 147 - 180
Autor principal: Weingarten, Oliver
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: MIT Press Autumn2024
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=182438788&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: hlh
    uiTerm: 182438788
    longDbName: Humanities International Complete
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        00221953
        JIH
      jtl: Journal of Interdisciplinary History
      issn: 00221953
      maglogo: N
    pubinfo:
      dt: Autumn2024
      vid: 55
      iid: 2
      pid: 776
      pub: MIT Press
    artinfo:
      ui:
        182438788
        10.1162/jinh_a_02036
      ppf: 147
      ppct: 33
      formats:
        fmt:
          – @attributes:
              type: T
          – @attributes:
              type: P
              size: 183KB
      tig:
        atl: Costly Signaling in Ancient Chinese Narratives.
      aug:
        au: Weingarten, Oliver
      su:
        Multiple comparisons (Statistics)
        Opportunity costs
        Signals & signaling
        Narratives
        Actors
      sug:
        subj:
          Multiple comparisons (Statistics)
          Opportunity costs
          Signals & signaling
          Narratives
          Actors
      ab: Seemingly reckless, wasteful, or self-harming actions depicted in narrative sources are embedded in the philosophical and political discourse of Warring States and early imperial China (around the third to the first century bce). Signaling theory unveils the underlying rationality of many such acts by demonstrating how they allow actors with conflicting interests to pursue their goals while reducing costs compared to alternative scenarios. Ancient Chinese thinkers did not discuss signaling theory in the abstract; they were, however, keenly aware of the underlying mechanisms, at times articulating them in the context of specific cases. Comparisons of multiple narrative versions suggest that plot elements related to signaling became more pronounced and the understanding of signaling more profound during the period, most likely due to heightened socio-political and military competition.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: Y
      custom: Copyright of Journal of Interdisciplinary History is the property of MIT Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.
      item: Journal of Interdisciplinary History
      holder: MIT Press
      dt:
        @attributes:
          year: 2024
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N