Inconsistent Belief Aggregation in Diverse and Polarised Groups.
How do opinion diversity and belief polarisation affect epistemic group decision-making, particularly if decisions must be made without delay and on the basis of permissive evidence? In an agent-based model, we track the consistency of group opinions aggregated through sentence-wise majority voting....
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 92; no. 1; pp. 40 - 59 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Jan2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=182582337&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 182582337 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2025 vid: 92 iid: 1 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 182582337 10.1017/psa.2024.29 ppf: 40 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.2MB tig: atl: Inconsistent Belief Aggregation in Diverse and Polarised Groups. aug: au: Kopecky, Felix Betz, Gregor affil: DebateLab, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Karlsruhe, Germany su: Polarization (Social sciences) Group decision making Plurality voting Legal evidence Simulation methods & models sug: subj: Polarization (Social sciences) Group decision making Plurality voting Legal evidence Simulation methods & models ab: How do opinion diversity and belief polarisation affect epistemic group decision-making, particularly if decisions must be made without delay and on the basis of permissive evidence? In an agent-based model, we track the consistency of group opinions aggregated through sentence-wise majority voting. Simulations on the model reveal that high opinion diversity, but not polarisation, incurs a significant inconsistency risk. These results indicate that epistemic group decisions based on permissive evidence can be particularly difficult for diverse groups. The results also improve our understanding of what can reasonably be expected of expert groups, and where expert advice might have limits. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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