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Epistemic reduction of the concept of ‘decision’.

“Reduction” is a widely rejected view of how commonsense psychological notions relate to neuroscience. I argue that there is a particular view of reduction on which reduction of the key commonsense concept of ‘decision’ is a live option. In particular, I advance a version of epistemic reduction base...

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Published in:Synthese Vol. 205; no. 2; pp. 1 - 26
Main Author: Burnston, Daniel C.
Format: Article
Published: Springer Nature Feb2025
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        10.1007/s11229-025-04917-8
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        atl: Epistemic reduction of the concept of ‘decision’.
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        au: Burnston, Daniel C.
        affil: https://ror.org/04vmvtb21 Philosophy Department, Tulane Brain Institute, Tulane University, New Orleans, LA, USA
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      keyword:
        Accumulation-to-bound models
        Common-sense psychology
        Decision
        Nagel
        Philosophy and Religious Studies Philosophy Psychology and Cognitive Sciences Psychology
        Reduction
      ab: “Reduction” is a widely rejected view of how commonsense psychological notions relate to neuroscience. I argue that there is a particular view of reduction on which reduction of the key commonsense concept of ‘decision’ is a live option. In particular, I advance a version of epistemic reduction based on “connectability.” On this view, reduction relations are not logical relationships, but instead posited identifications that guide subsequent modeling efforts, and are substantiated if one can explain higher-level generalizations with lower-level models. I apply this view to the field of decision neuroscience, and in particular accumulation to bound models of decision-making. I show how this field is achieving the advantages of reductive explanation, including providing increasingly detailed and novel predictions, unifying distinct types of decisions under a single account, and explaining anomalies of rational decision-making. If I am right, the widespread anti-reductive attitude in philosophy of mind needs to be reconsidered.
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    language: English
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