A Problem for Extensional Articulations of Physicalism.
Extensional articulations of physicalism define what it means to be physical relative to the properties of a set of entities, such that physicalism is true if the fundamental properties which compose the entities in this set are the same sorts of fundamental properties which compose everything that...
| Publicado en: | Erkenntnis Vol. 90; no. 1; pp. 143 - 151 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jan2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=182845346&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 182845346 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01650106 5KZ jtl: Erkenntnis issn: 01650106 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2025 vid: 90 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 182845346 10.1007/s10670-023-00689-0 ppf: 143 ppct: 8 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 516KB tig: atl: A Problem for Extensional Articulations of Physicalism. aug: au: Brown, Christopher Devlin affil: https://ror.org/00mcjh785 Xiamen University, Xiamen, China su: Materialism Idealism Definitions sug: subj: Materialism Idealism Definitions ab: Extensional articulations of physicalism define what it means to be physical relative to the properties of a set of entities, such that physicalism is true if the fundamental properties which compose the entities in this set are the same sorts of fundamental properties which compose everything that exists. Here I present a novel problem for these articulations of physicalism: they are consistent with phenomenal idealism, which is the view that only phenomenal properties exist. Under this view, paradigm physical objects such as tables and chairs are constructed out of more basic phenomenal properties. Since this view says that everything—including paradigm physical entities—is ultimately constituted by phenomenal properties, it follows that this view is consistent with extensional definitions of physicalism, since such definitions only require that there be no fundamental difference between paradigm physical entities and everything else. Yet a good definition of physicalism should not be consistent with phenomenal idealism. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2025. All Rights Reserved. item: Erkenntnis holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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