Same but Different: Providing a Probabilistic Foundation for the Feature-Matching Approach to Similarity and Categorization: Same but Different: Providing a Probabilistic Foundation...: N. Poth.
The feature-matching approach pioneered by Amos Tversky remains a groundwork for psychological models of similarity and categorization but is rarely explicitly justified considering recent advances in thinking about cognition. While psychologists often view similarity as an unproblematic foundationa...
| Publicado en: | Erkenntnis Vol. 90; no. 1; pp. 237 - 262 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jan2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=182845353&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 182845353 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01650106 5KZ jtl: Erkenntnis issn: 01650106 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2025 vid: 90 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 182845353 10.1007/s10670-023-00696-1 ppf: 237 ppct: 25 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 940KB tig: atl: Same but Different: Providing a Probabilistic Foundation for the Feature-Matching Approach to Similarity and Categorization: Same but Different: Providing a Probabilistic Foundation...: N. Poth. aug: au: Poth, Nina affil: https://ror.org/04tsk2644 Institute for Philosophy II, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universitätsstraße 150, 44801, Bochum, Germany https://ror.org/01hcx6992 Institut für Philosophie, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Berlin, Germany su: Cognitive psychology Psychologists Inference (Logic) Generalization sug: subj: Cognitive psychology Psychologists Inference (Logic) Generalization keyword: Psychology and Cognitive Sciences Psychology ab: The feature-matching approach pioneered by Amos Tversky remains a groundwork for psychological models of similarity and categorization but is rarely explicitly justified considering recent advances in thinking about cognition. While psychologists often view similarity as an unproblematic foundational concept that explains generalization and conceptual thought, long-standing philosophical problems challenging this assumption suggest that similarity derives from processes of higher-level cognition, including inference and conceptual thought. This paper addresses three specific challenges to Tversky's approach: (i) the feature-selection problem, (ii) the problem of cognitive implausibility, and (iii) the problem of unprincipled tweaking. It subsequently supports key insights from Tversky's account based on recent developments in Bayesian modeling of cognition. A novel computational view of similarity as inference is proposed that addresses each challenge by considering the contrast class as constitutive of similarity and selecting for highly informative features. In so doing, this view illustrates the ongoing promise of the feature-matching approach in explaining perception, generalization and conceptual thought by grounding them in principles of probabilistic inference. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2025. All Rights Reserved. item: Erkenntnis holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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