Corroboration and uncertainty.
In science, uncertainty is always with us, both in observations and in predictions from theory. This paper investigates the important role played by uncertainty in two related problems in philosophy of science: corroboration and the language-dependence of closeness to truth. When predictions from th...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 205; no. 2; pp. 1 - 21 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Feb2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=182863680&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 182863680 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Feb2025 vid: 205 iid: 2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 182863680 10.1007/s11229-024-04835-1 ppf: 1 ppct: 20 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 2MB tig: atl: Corroboration and uncertainty. aug: au: Eyre, John affil: https://ror.org/01ch2yn61 Retired (Formerly Met Office, UK), Exeter, UK sug: keyword: Closeness Comparison with observations Philosophy and Religious Studies Philosophy Predictions Scientific theory ab: In science, uncertainty is always with us, both in observations and in predictions from theory. This paper investigates the important role played by uncertainty in two related problems in philosophy of science: corroboration and the language-dependence of closeness to truth. When predictions from theory are confronted with observations, the theories can be falsified or corroborated. This is an iterative process, since new observations may falsify a previously corroborated theory. Quantification of uncertainty is crucial in determining whether a prediction is consistent with an observation or not. Moreover, quantitative measures of corroboration must be time-dependent, because they rely on estimates of uncertainty, which are always open to reassessment. We also discuss some consequences of these ideas on corroboration for theories of verisimilitude. In response to Karl Popper’s original concept of verisimilitude, Pavel Tichý offered an alternative method for ranking theories in terms of closeness to truth. David Miller raised objections, showing that rankings within Tichý’s system did not survive transformation into a different mathematical space. This problem is named here the “Miller-Tichý paradox”, and it has implications for the language-dependence of closeness to truth. We show how this paradox can be resolved by taking account of the inevitable uncertainties in observations and in predictions from theory. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2025. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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