Belief Revision Normalized: Belief Revision Normalized∗: J. Goodman and B. Salow.
We use the normality framework of Goodman and Salow (2018, 2021, 2023b) to investigate of dynamics of rational belief. The guiding idea is that people are entitled to believe that their circumstances aren't especially abnormal. More precisely, a rational agent's beliefs rule out all and only those p...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Philosophical Logic Vol. 54; no. 1; pp. 1 - 50 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Feb2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=183283951&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 183283951 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00223611 JPH jtl: Journal of Philosophical Logic issn: 00223611 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Feb2025 vid: 54 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 183283951 10.1007/s10992-024-09769-0 ppf: 1 ppct: 49 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 790KB tig: atl: Belief Revision Normalized: Belief Revision Normalized∗: J. Goodman and B. Salow. aug: au: Goodman, Jeremy Salow, Bernhard affil: https://ror.org/00za53h95 John Hopkins University, 21218, Baltimore, MD, USA https://ror.org/052gg0110 Magdalen College, University of Oxford, OX1 4AU, Oxford, UK su: Logic Probability theory Possibility Forecasting sug: subj: Logic Probability theory Possibility Forecasting keyword: Belief and probability Belief revision Evidence Normality ab: We use the normality framework of Goodman and Salow (2018, 2021, 2023b) to investigate of dynamics of rational belief. The guiding idea is that people are entitled to believe that their circumstances aren't especially abnormal. More precisely, a rational agent's beliefs rule out all and only those possibilities that are either (i) ruled out by their evidence or (ii) sufficiently less normal than some other possibility not ruled out by their evidence. Working within this framework, we argue that the logic of rational belief revision is much weaker than is usually supposed. We do so by isolating a natural family of orthodox principles about belief revision, describing realistic cases in which these principles seem to fail, and showing how these counterexamples are predicted by independently motivated models of the cases in question. In these models, whether one evidential possibility counts as sufficiently less normal than another is determined by underlying probabilities (together with a contextually determined question). We argue that the resulting probabilistic account of belief compares favorably with other such accounts, including Lockeanism (Foley, 1993), a 'stability' account inspired by Leitgeb (2017), the 'tracking theory' of Lin and Kelly (2012), and the influential precursor of Levi (1967). We show that all of these accounts yield subtly different but similarly heterodox logics of belief revision. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Journal of Philosophical Logic is a copyright of Springer, 2025. All Rights Reserved. item: Journal of Philosophical Logic holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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