Mapping content: why cognitive maps are non-conceptual mental states.
Cognitive maps play a crucial role in mammalian navigation. They provide the organism with information about its own location and the locations of landmarks within known environments. Cognitive maps have yet to receive ample attention in philosophy. In this article, we argue that cognitive maps shou...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 205; no. 3; pp. 1 - 26 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Mar2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=183305381&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 183305381 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2025 vid: 205 iid: 3 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 183305381 10.1007/s11229-025-04922-x ppf: 1 ppct: 25 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.1MB tig: atl: Mapping content: why cognitive maps are non-conceptual mental states. aug: au: Schwartz, Arieh Fresco, Nir affil: https://ror.org/0090zs177 Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Sciences, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK https://ror.org/05tkyf982 Department of Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Be’er Sheva, Israel https://ror.org/05tkyf982 School of Brain Sciences and Cognition, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Be’er Sheva, Israel sug: keyword: Belief Cognitive maps Navigation Non-conceptual content Philosophy and Religious Studies Philosophy Psychology and Cognitive Sciences Psychology ab: Cognitive maps play a crucial role in mammalian navigation. They provide the organism with information about its own location and the locations of landmarks within known environments. Cognitive maps have yet to receive ample attention in philosophy. In this article, we argue that cognitive maps should not be understood along the lines of conceptual mental states, such as beliefs and desires. They are more plausibly understood to be non-conceptual. We clarify what is at stake in this claim, and offer two empirically-informed arguments in its favor. Both arguments submit that cognitive maps are probably non-conceptual because their representational structure seems to differ from that of conceptual mental states. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2025. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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