Beyond the extended mind: new arguments for extensive enactivism.
Clark and Chalmers (Analysis 58:7–19, 1998) landmark paper, The Extended Mind, launched a thousand ships and changed the contours of the larger sea of theorizing about cognition. Over the past twenty-six years, it has led to intense philosophical debates about of the constitutive bounds of mind and...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 205; no. 3; pp. 1 - 26 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Mar2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=183467563&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 183467563 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2025 vid: 205 iid: 3 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 183467563 10.1007/s11229-025-04931-w ppf: 1 ppct: 25 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.2MB tig: atl: Beyond the extended mind: new arguments for extensive enactivism. aug: au: Sganzerla, Lorena Hutto, Daniel D. Kirchhoff, Michael D. affil: https://ror.org/00jtmb277 School of Liberal Arts, Faculty of Arts, Social Sciences and Humanities, University of Wollongong, 2522, Wollongong, NSW, Australia sug: keyword: Autonomous enactivism Computation Distributed cognition Extended mind Information processing Mental fictionalism Philosophy and Religious Studies Philosophy Radical enactivism Representation ab: Clark and Chalmers (Analysis 58:7–19, 1998) landmark paper, The Extended Mind, launched a thousand ships and changed the contours of the larger sea of theorizing about cognition. Over the past twenty-six years, it has led to intense philosophical debates about of the constitutive bounds of mind and cognition and generated multiple waves of work taking the form of various attempts to clarify and defend its core thesis. The extended mind thesis states that under certain (specialized and particular) conditions cognitive processes may be constituted by resources distributed across the brain, the body, and the environment. The extended mind thesis is part of a larger family of theoretical frameworks such as embodied cognition, distributed cognition, and various versions of enactivism (Gallagher in South J Philos 56: 421–447, 2018; Hutchins in Cognition in the wild, The MIT Press, 1995; Varela et al. in The embodied mind: cognitive science and human experience, The MIT Press, 1991; Di Paolo in Topoi 28:9–21, 2009; Hutto and Myin in Radicalizing enactivism: basic minds without content, The MIT Press, 2013; Hutto and Myin in Evolving enactivism: basic minds meet content, The MIT Press, 2017). In this paper we revive and clarify the commitments of Radical Enactivism’s Extensive Enactivism, compare it to alternatives, and provide new arguments and analyses for preferring it over what is on offer from other members of the extended-distributed-enactive family of positions. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2025. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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