| Sumario: | This article identifies and explains the manifold methodological, metaphysical, and epistemological errors vitiating R.G. Collingwood's theory of re-enactment. The aim is not only to refute Collingwood's claims and conclusions but also to expose the faulty reasoning on which they are based. An adjunct goal is to subject the currently consensual interpretation of Collingwood's theory of re-enactment to close interrogation in order to examine both (1) vital elements of his theory that the revisionist interpretation ignores, smooths over, or distorts and (2) the crucial instances where Collingwood's assertions directly contradict this interpretation. A tertiary motive of the inquiry is to foster or at least facilitate a paradigm shift in the exegesis of the theory of re-enactment. Among many others, one vector of analysis concerns detection and explication of the diverse types of metaphysical impossibility that Collingwood's theory entrains. Another vector involves both the defence and supersession of certain elements of the prior consensual interpretation that the current consensual interpretation mistakenly claims to have refuted.
|
|---|