Controlling a moving world: Territorial control, displacement and the spread of civilian targeting in Iraq.
How do armed actors respond to population movements during civil wars? I argue that displacement alters local balances of control between territorial rulers and challengers. Local territorial rulers have incentives to govern violently if displaced persons perceived as members of opposing loyalty gro...
| Published in: | Journal of Peace Research Vol. 62; no. 2; pp. 211 - 230 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Mar2025
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=183687238&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 183687238 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00223433 JPR jtl: Journal of Peace Research issn: 00223433 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Mar2025 vid: 62 iid: 2 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 183687238 10.1177/00223433231202823 ppf: 211 ppct: 19 formats: tig: atl: Controlling a moving world: Territorial control, displacement and the spread of civilian targeting in Iraq. aug: au: Weber, Sigrid affil: Immigration Policy Lab, Stanford University su: Iraq Political refugees Civil war War Machine learning Computer programming education sug: subj: Political refugees Civil war War Iraq Other Computer Related Services Computer systems design and related services (except video game design and development) Custom Computer Programming Services Machine learning Computer programming education keyword: contagion displacement one-sided violence territorial control contagion displacement one-sided violence territorial control ab: How do armed actors respond to population movements during civil wars? I argue that displacement alters local balances of control between territorial rulers and challengers. Local territorial rulers have incentives to govern violently if displaced persons perceived as members of opposing loyalty groups move into their territories and challengers spoil local governance by inflicting harm on civilians if incoming supporters of a local ruler reinforce the governor's control. To test these dynamics, I use a combination of manual coding and machine learning to create a novel monthly dataset of territorial control, one-sided violence against moving populations and displacement patterns disaggregated by ethno-religious groups in the war against the Islamic State (2014–2017) in Iraq. Using negative binomial count models, I find that territorial challengers and rulers distinctively respond to population movements in Iraq. The paper extends previous theories of civilian victimization and territorial control by conceptualizing local populations as a dynamic element that explains where fleeing civilians become moving targets. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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