Wrongdoer-Centered Reasons for Blame.

I argue that we have reasons to blame wrongdoers for their own sake. Then, I offer an account of the nature of these reasons. One of blame's key functions, I suggest, is to express concern for wrongdoers' quality of will—a form of concern I call contribution recognition. We can disrespect people by...

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Publicado en:Ethics Vol. 135; no. 3; pp. 489 - 519
Autor principal: Lichter, Andrew
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: University of Chicago Press Apr2025
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Wrongdoer-Centered Reasons for Blame.
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        Ethics
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          Philosophy
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      ab: I argue that we have reasons to blame wrongdoers for their own sake. Then, I offer an account of the nature of these reasons. One of blame's key functions, I suggest, is to express concern for wrongdoers' quality of will—a form of concern I call contribution recognition. We can disrespect people by treating them as though the quality of will expressed in their moral contributions (specifically, their blameworthy actions) does not much matter. Conversely, we can affirm a person's moral significance or significance to us by expressing concern with her quality of will.
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