Listening to algorithms: The case of self‐knowledge.

This paper begins with the thought that there is something out of place about offloading inquiry into one's own mind to AI. The paper's primary goal is to articulate the unease felt when considering cases of doing so. It draws a parallel between the use of algorithms in the criminal law: in both cas...

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Publicado en:European Journal of Philosophy Vol. 33; no. 1; pp. 134 - 148
Autor principal: Doyle, Casey
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Mar2025
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: Doyle, Casey
        affil: Binghamton University, Binghamton New York, , USA
      su:
        Algorithms
        Criminal law
        Artificial intelligence
        Philosophy
        Philosophy periodicals
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          Algorithms
          Criminal law
          Artificial intelligence
          Philosophy
          Philosophy periodicals
      ab: This paper begins with the thought that there is something out of place about offloading inquiry into one's own mind to AI. The paper's primary goal is to articulate the unease felt when considering cases of doing so. It draws a parallel between the use of algorithms in the criminal law: in both cases one feels entitled to be treated as an exception to a verdict made on the basis of a certain kind of evidence. Then it identifies an account of first‐person authority that can make good on this: agentialism. Thus, the paper constitutes an argument in favor of an agentialist treatment of self‐knowledge and first‐person authority.
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    language: English
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