| Sumario: | This paper is a defence of the view that, contrary to a recent trend in the literature, there is a distinctively political kind of normativity. Four steps are taken to establish that conclusion. First, I introduce a constructivist methodology for practical philosophy, one that is focused on the problem-solving nature of normative concepts. Second, I propose to understand the political as constituted by political problems, that is, by problems that concern members of a collective as members of that collective. Third, I claim that there is a kind of collective obligations, which I call political collective obligations, that do not provide direct and clear action guidance to those subject to them, but that are rather best conceived of as thin obligations. Such thin obligations stemming from properly conceived political problems constitute a distinctive kind of normativity, the normativity of politics. Because political collective obligations typically lack action guidance, what they mandate is that each obliged agent contribute their share to what they normatively regard as the best collective solution to the political problem. The paper concludes with some considerations about the so-called inefficacy problem in light of the previously established conclusions.
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