Is superintelligence necessarily moral?
Numerous authors have expressed concern that advanced artificial intelligence (AI) poses an existential risk to humanity. These authors argue that we might build AI which is vastly intellectually superior to humans (a 'superintelligence'), and which optimizes for goals that strike us as morally bad,...
| Publicado en: | Analysis Vol. 84; no. 4; pp. 730 - 739 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Oct2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=183906880&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 183906880 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00032638 7OX jtl: Analysis issn: 00032638 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2024 vid: 84 iid: 4 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 183906880 10.1093/analys/anae033 ppf: 730 ppct: 9 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 292KB tig: atl: Is superintelligence necessarily moral? aug: au: Dung, Leonard affil: University Erlangen-Nürnberg Germany su: Artificial intelligence Realism Externalism (Philosophy of mind) Moral reasoning Humanity sug: subj: Artificial intelligence Realism Externalism (Philosophy of mind) Moral reasoning Humanity keyword: AI alignment existential risk moral motivation orthogonality thesis reward hacking superintelligence ab: Numerous authors have expressed concern that advanced artificial intelligence (AI) poses an existential risk to humanity. These authors argue that we might build AI which is vastly intellectually superior to humans (a 'superintelligence'), and which optimizes for goals that strike us as morally bad, or even irrational. Thus this argument assumes that a superintelligence might have morally bad goals. However, according to some views, a superintelligence necessarily has morally adequate goals. This might be the case either because abilities for moral reasoning and intelligence mutually depend on each other, or because moral realism and moral internalism are true. I argue that the former argument misconstrues the view that intelligence and goals are independent, and that the latter argument misunderstands the implications of moral internalism. Moreover, the current state of AI research provides additional reasons to think that a superintelligence could have bad goals. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: © 2019 The Analysis Trust. item: Analysis holder: Oxford University Press / USA dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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