The Competitive Conduct of Consumer Cooperatives.
Consumer cooperatives are firms owned by their customers. Although their organizational form should commit these firms not to exploit their market power, in practice, weak governance may allow managers to pursue other objectives. Using data and a structural model, we test whether consumer cooperativ...
| Publicado en: | RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 56; no. 1; pp. 106 - 126 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Spring2025
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=183913527&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 183913527 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 07416261 56RJ jtl: RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) issn: 07416261 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Spring2025 vid: 56 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 183913527 10.1111/1756-2171.12496 ppf: 106 ppct: 20 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 363KB tig: atl: The Competitive Conduct of Consumer Cooperatives. aug: au: Duarte, Marco Magnolfi, Lorenzo Roncoroni, Camilla affil: Department of Economics, University of North Carolina‐Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill NC,, USA Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin‐Madison, Madison WI,, USA Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK su: Consumer cooperatives Consumers Profit maximization Market power Structural models sug: subj: Consumer cooperatives Consumers Profit maximization Market power Structural models keyword: consumer cooperative market power supermarket industry test of conduct consumer cooperative market power supermarket industry test of conduct ab: Consumer cooperatives are firms owned by their customers. Although their organizational form should commit these firms not to exploit their market power, in practice, weak governance may allow managers to pursue other objectives. Using data and a structural model, we test whether consumer cooperatives in the Italian supermarket industry act as profit‐maximizing firms. We find no significant deviations from profit maximization. Based on a counterfactual exercise, even a mild degree of internalization of consumer welfare by the cooperatives that we study would yield consumer welfare gains comparable to the regulatory advantages they enjoy. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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